In the short term, stabilise the Line of Actual Control

CategoryPolity

Last Updated07/06/2023

For the last few years, the situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has continued to remain extremely tense; it has just stopped short of a war, with the Doklam and Galwan crises.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC), in the context of the Sino-Indian border dispute, is a notional demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
The LAC is different from the borders claimed by each country in the Sino-Indian border dispute. The Indian claims include the entire Aksai Chin region and the Chinese claims include Zangnan (South Tibet)/Arunachal Pradesh. These claims are not included in the concept of "actual control".
The LAC is generally divided into three sectors:
- The western sector between Ladakh on the Indian side and the Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions on the Chinese side;
- The middle sector between Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side;
- The eastern sector between Zangnan(South Tibet)/Arunachal Pradesh on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side. This sector generally follows the McMahon Line.

The India-China engagement got an impetus after the visit by then Indian Prime Minister to China in December 1988.
Since then, four agreements have been signed between the two countries (in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013) to maintain peace along the LAC, laying the framework for dealing with the border issue and covering the spectrum of engagement from the highest levels of government to border personnel meetings in the field.
For more than two decades, these arrangements have served their purpose well. However, the heightened tension on the LAC suggests that there are inadequacies in the agreements.
The current mindset among the Indian security establishment is to be “unyielding” with China as it is felt that the “salami slicing tactics” of the Chinese must be halted.
While firmness is essential, there is also a need to identify the reasons for rising clashes on the LAC and working on solutions.
The opinion is that aggression is not the only reason for the rise in LAC incidents; the quantum jump in surveillance technology provides visibility of movement of opposing forces in areas that were blind spots earlier.
This coupled with increased troop density, better roads, improved logistics and availability of aviation assets enhance the reaction capability, thereby increasing the face-offs and clashes.

Converting the LAC into a Line of Control (LC) by delineating it on the map and on the ground without prejudice to border claims. This will reduce the urge among the forward troops to inch forward. This may seem difficult but can be implemented with a display of maturity by both sides and with the use of technology.
Further, it needs to build robust Infrastructure in difficult border areas in its territory to ensure movement of personnel and other logistical supplies in an efficient manner.
Border troops should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions.
The two sides should abide by all the existing agreements and protocols on China-India boundary affairs and avoid any action that could escalate matters.
The disputed areas on the LAC can be treated as no entry zones; alternatively, both sides should be allowed to patrol these areas as per a mutually agreed frequency.
Joint patrolling of the disputed areas must also be explored as this can result in the maintenance of status quo and an increase in confidence.
Existing Confidence Building Measures and engagement mechanisms need to be strengthened so that local issues can be resolved quickly.

The complexity of the India-China border problem precludes a permanent solution on an immediate basis. Thus, it is better that both sides consider taking short-term but effective and pragmatic steps to stabilise the LAC, reducing the possibilities of a conflict.